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A somewhat abridged and adapted ver-
sion of this review appeared under the
title “Honesty in inference” in American
Scientist 92:2 (Feb.–Mar. 2004), 182–185.
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Electr. and Computer Eng., Boston University
Probability Theory—The Logic of Science, E. T. Jaynes,
xxx+727 pp. Cambridge University Press, 2003. $60.00.
The true Logic for this world is the Calculus of Probabilities.
[Maxwell, to his friend Lewis Cambell]
The review of a posthumous book (Edwin Jaynes died in
1998) demands particular care in balancing love for the au-
thor with critical detachment in the interest of the readers.
I risk, of course, to be found wanting on both counts.
Edwin Jaynes is best known as pioneer and champion
of the Maximum Entropy Principle (maxent for insiders):
If, in a given context, you need to formulate a probabil-
ity distribution on which to base your initial bets, choose,
among all possible distributions that agree with what you
know about the problem, the one having maximum en-
tropy. Why? Is this guaranteed to be the “real” (whatever
that may mean) probability distribution? Of course not!
In fact you will most likely replace it with a new one as
soon as you see the outcome of the first trial—because by
then you’ll have one more piece of information. Why, then?
Because any other choice would be equivalent to throwing
away some of the information you have or assuming infor-
mation you don’t have. If you had to program a robot (of
which more below) to autonomously cope with the uncer-
tainties of Mars’s environment, you’d want its choices to be
weigthed by the maxent principle; anything else would be
indefensible.
In view of the central role that this principle plays in
Jaynes’ gospel, it may come as a surprise that, out of the
book’s 700 pages, barely 30 are devoted to it; important as
maxent is in practice, from a conceptual viewpoint Jaynes
clearly regards it a mere corollary. What, then, is this book
about? In Jaynes’ words, “simply, probability theory as
extended logic.”
In introductory philosophy courses it is not unusual to
see induction naively presented as “the opposite of” deduc-
tion. Deduction always draws assured consequences from
the premises, but—under a curse akin to Cassandra’s—will
never tell us anything that was not already in the premises;
specifically, if the premises represent what we know, deduc-
tion cannot tell us anything we didn’t know to begin with.
Induction, on the other hand, works backwards from em-
pirical facts to general principles. In this way it can tell us
something new, but—that curse again—will never guaran-
tee its revelations.
As a matter of fact, pace Hume and Popper, no such an-
tithesis exists. There is a single inference machine, whose
kernel is ordinary logic. We feed the machine with a collec-
tion of statements—logic does not care in what order they
are given and whether we call them hypotheses, empiri-
cal facts, axioms, or priors—and we ask a Yes/No question
A. Then we turn the crank, and after some grinding the
machine will reply “Yes,” “No,” or “I don’t know.” (If you
worry about undecidable problems, add a countdown timer,
and when the time is up the machine will answer “I don’t
know yet.”) That’s all there is to it!
Owing to the above curse, a single shot at this machine
is of limited value. Its glory is revealed, however, when we
make it part of a feedback loop. Suppose we got “Don’t
know” for an answer. We can then further and further
qualify the input statements—the premises—until we get
a definite Yes or No answer. Proceeding in this way with
differents sets of premises—different scenarios, as it were—
we can explore a whole space of scenarios and see which
ones yield “Yes” and which “No.” And where do we get
probability? you may ask. Briefly (and here I must skip a
lot of fine print), once we have many scenarios (think of all
possible hands in a card game or molecular configurations of
a liter of gas) we may have to give up trying to handle them
one by one and resign ourselves instead to dealing with them
“in bulk,” bagging them according to some criteria, labeling
each bag and keeping track only of how many scenarios we
put in it. (Absolute counts don’t matter much here—only
relative ones do. For instance, if we add to our parameters a
binary variable irrelevant to our inquiry, each scenario will
split into two and thus the size of every bag will double,
but the overall fraction of scenarios represented by each
bag will not.) The probability of our original question A
being true is the fraction of scenarios for which the machine
answers “Yes.” This probability is of course conditioned
by the prior, that is, the premises X that remained fixed
while we were running through the scenarios (one of these
premises being the set of admissible scenarios itself), and is
accordingly denoted p(A|X). If this probability distribution
p(A|X) doesn’t seem to lead us to good bets, all we can do
is revise our prior X . “As Harold Jeffreys explained long
ago, induction is most valuable to a scientist just when it
turns out to be wrong; only then do we get new fundamental
knowledge.”
The probability thus defined obeys by construction those
quantitative rules that, as Jaynes argues following Cox
and Polya, are the basic desiderata of plausible reasoning,
namely the product rule,
p(AB|X) = p(A|X)p(B|AX) = p(B|X)p(A|BX)
and the sum rule
p(A +B|X) = p(A|X) + p(B|X)− p(AB|X).
Of course, different priors may lead to different probabil-
ity distributions. However, the great majority of variables
in the whole world may be presumed to be roughly orthogo-
nal to the specific phenomena under investigation. To para-
phrase Borel, the microscopic scenarios that make up a bag
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marked, say, “coin turned up heads” are likely to be totally
replaced by different microscopic scenarios when the prior
changes from “full moon” to “new moon,” yet the numerical
contents of each bag will hardly be affected—and thus the
typical gambler in his den will never notice the difference.
This observation is conceivably at the root of the mind
projection fallacy most often attacked by Jaynes, namely,
that probabilities (such as of a coin’s turning up heads) rep-
resent intrinsic properties of physics rather than a descrip-
tion of one’s knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of the situa-
tion. “As we’ve noted several times, the idea that probabil-
ities are physical real things, based ultimately on observed
frequencies of random variables, underlies most recent ex-
positions of probability theory, which would seem to make
it a branch of experimental science. . . . We take time off for
an interlude of physical considerations that show the funda-
mental difficulty with the notion of a ‘random’ experiment.”
And there follows an amusing chapter in which Jaynes dis-
cusses how to cheat at coin and die tossing, dicusses card
hands, and shows that the frequentists’ cherished notion
of probability as the ‘limit of an infinite sequence of iden-
tical random experiments’ is immediately dumped by the
frequentists themselves as soon as they are confronted with
a questionable shuffler.
Are probabilities, then, just in our mind? “Our proba-
bilities and the entropies based on them are indeed ‘subjec-
tive’ in the sense that they represent human information;
if they did not, they could not serve their purpose. But
they are completely ‘objective’ in the sense that they are
determined by the information specified [i.e., the prior X ,
via the inference machine], independent of anyone’s person-
ality, opinions, or hopes. It is ‘objectivity’ in this sense
that we need if information is ever to be a basis for new
theoretical developments in science.”
Much as Maxwell’s daemon was introduced to bring at-
tention to certain issues of thermodynamics, and Turing’s
machine to discuss thought without being conditioned by
too much human baggage, thus to wean us from the sub-
jective/objective dilemma Jaynes encourages us to come up
with inference rules that could be implemented by a robot.
“In order to direct attention to constructive things and away
from controversial irrelevancies, we shall invent an imagi-
nary being. Its brain is to be designed by us, so that it rea-
sons according to certain definite rules. These rules will be
deduced from simple desiderata . . . that a rational person
[would not wish to violate].” These desiderata boil down to
(I) Degrees of plausibility are represented by real num-
bers.
(II) Qualitative correspondence with common sense.
(III) Consistency.
Specifically (and here Asimov’s “Three Laws of Robotics”
will come to mind),
(IIIb) The robot always takes into account all the evi-
dence it has relevant to a question. It does not arbitrar-
ily ignore some of the information. . . . In other words, the
robot is completely nonideological.
(IIIc) The robot always represents equivalent states of
knowledge by equivalent plausibility assignments. . . .
From these desiderata Jaynes naturally derives all of the
Bayesian machinery for statistical inference (incidentally,
Bayes never wrote “Bayes’ theorem”—it’s really Laplace’s).
Was all this necessary? I’ll quote Jaynes from one of
his latest apologies for his life’s enterprise (“Probabilities
in quantum theory,” 1990; Jaynes retired in 1992, and after
that he doesn’t seem to have been very active in probabil-
ity theory, though he spent much time on a book on The
Physical Basis of Music, available online.)
The original view of James Bernoulli and Laplace
was that probability theory is an extension of logic
to the case where, because of incomplete informa-
tion, deductive reasoning by the Aristotelean syl-
logism is not available. It was sometimes called
“the calculus of inductive reasoning.” All of La-
palace’s great contributions to science were made
with the help of probability theory interpreted in
this way.
But, starting in the mid-19th Century, Laplace’s
viewpoint came under violent attack from Leslie
Ellis, John Venn, George Boole, R. von Mises, R.
A. Fisher, M. G. Kendall, W. Feller, J. Neyman,
and others. . . . This school of thought was so ag-
gressive that it has dominated the field almost to-
tally, so that virtually all probability textbooks in
current use are written from a viewpoint which
rejects Laplace’s interpretation and tries to deny
us the use of his methods. Almost the only ex-
ceptions are found in the works of Harold Jeffreys
and Arnold Zellner. We have written two short
histories of these matters, engaged in a polemical
debate on them, and are trying to finish a two-
volume treatise on the subject, entitled Probabil-
ity Theory—The Logic of Science.
Here is the book at last, a big tome in two parts if not
two volumes, edited from a coherent though incomplete
manuscript (formerly available online) by Jaynes’ one-time
doctoral advisee and then colleague and collaborator Larry
Bretthorst.
Even after having slashed at half the world, in the end
Jaynes finds himself in very good company. “Our system of
probability could hardly be more different from that of Kol-
mogorov, in style, philosophy, and purpose. What we con-
sider to be fully half of probability theory . . .—the princi-
ples for assigning probabilities by logical analysis of incom-
plete information—is not present at all in the Kolmogorov
system. Yet, when all is said and done, we find ourselves,
to our own surprise, in agreement with Kolmogorov and in
disagreement with his critics, on nearly all technical issues.”
Jaynes has been accused of exaggerating the differ-
ences between the “orthodox” probability school—Fisher
and frequentist company—and his maxent school of
Bayesian/Laplacian revivalists. But now that it no longer
takes an act of courage to profess the Bayesian faith
(younger students of statistics don’t even realize that there
ever was an issue) it’s hard to imagine how different the
world of statistical inference might have been, especially in
image processing, data mining, and bioengineering, without
Jaynes’ thirty years of preaching and rallying the flock.
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Beside the polemical aspects, whose raison-d’eˆtre is to
some extent extinguished today, and the conceptual and
technical aspects, which remain valid but may no longer be
as revolutionary as they sound simply because the revolu-
tion has been won, there is one facet of Jaynes’ gospel that
is particularly visible in this book and remains as fresh as
ever, namely, a relentless drive to demystify and democra-
tize science. Science is especially successful when it turns
difficult tasks into trivial ones (how else could we be made
free to tackle today’s new difficult tasks?). But technical
people who used to thrive on the very former difficulties are
loath to lose their competitive advantage. Abstruseness,
lack of universal rules (“ad-hoc-ness”), and intimation of
magic betray an attempt (inconscious, perhaps) to retain
control. “Feller’s perception was so keen that in virtually
every problem he was able to see a clever trick; and then
gave only the clever trick. So his readers got the impression
that: (1) Probability theory has no systematic method; it is
a collection of unrelated clever tricks, each of which works
on one problem but not on the next one; (2) Feller was pos-
sessed of superhuman cleverness; (3) Only a person with
such cleverness can hope to find new useful results in prob-
ability theory.”
We can also sense the indignation that a poor Iowa or-
phan boy must have felt towards those Pooh-Bahs (“Sir”
Ronald Fisher, Cambridge alumnus, F.R.S, Royal Medal,
and so forth) that, instead of using their high position to
help streamline scientific thought, kept adding clutter to
it (and, to add insult to injury, had the gall to knowingly
speak of Nature’s “propensities” without being physicists
themselves).
In this book as well as in his other writings Jaynes dis-
plays an intensity of missionary zeal worthy of a St. Paul.
We can only speculate what vision hit the latter on his road
to Damascus, but in Jaynes’ case we are in possession of an
autobiographical snapshot. (In all that follows, italics are
mine.)
“Those who cling to a belief in the existence of ‘physical
probabilities’ may react to [the present approach to prob-
ability] by pointing to quantum theory, in which physical
probabilities appear to express the most fundamental laws
of physics. . . . [But here too] probabilities [must] express
our ignorance.” And he goes on to argue that “this igno-
rance may be unavoidable in practice, but in our present
state of knowledge we do not know whether it is unavoid-
able in principle” (remark that Jaynes is well aware of Bell’s
theorem and has no qualms with it); “the ‘central dogma’
simply asserts this, and draws the conclusion that belief
in causes, and searching for them, is philosophically na¨ıve.”
(Intimidation by the “orthodox,” again.) “Because of recent
spectacular advances in the technology of experimentation,
with increasingly detailed control over the initial state of in-
dividual atoms . . . we thing that the stage is going to be set,
before many more years have passed, for the same thing [as
the Bayesian revolution] to happen in quantum theory.” (In
fact, today we are beginning to dabble with nanotechnology
and quantum computers.) “A century from now the true
cause of microphenomena will be known to every school-
boy and, to paraphrase Seneca, they will be incredulous
that such clear truths could have escaped us throughout
the 20th (and into the 21st) century.”
And here is the snapshot, from the above-mentioned apol-
ogy: “This conviction has affected the whole course of my
career. I had intended originally to specialize in Quantum
Electrodynamics, but this proved to be impossible [because]
whenever I look at any quantum-mechanical calculations,
the basic craziness of what we are doing rises in my gorge[!]
and I have to try to find some different way of looking at
the problem that makes physical sense. Gradually, I came
to see that the foundation of probability theory and the
role of human information have to be brought in, and I
have spent many years trying to understand them in the
greatest generality.”
Then the consolidation of Bayesian inference, maxent,
this book, and all the rest, have just been a long detour on
a (yet unfulfilled) quest for the Holy Grail? What then?
Thanks to the boy from Iowa, today every schoolboy (and
every scholar) can approach inference unhampered by ab-
surd probability myths.
Most thick technical books are purchased with hope but
then hardly ever touched. This book was meant to be read
and is a pleasure to read. (Also, since the subject index
is rather skimpy, often the best way to locate an item is
to read a whole chapter through, whereby you’ll find lots
of extra rewarding stuff.) The bibliography is rich and full
of annotations. There are many exercises, and occasionally
the editor has creatively turned a gap in the manuscript
into an exercise for the reader.
You may disagree here and there, but Jaynes is an honest
scientist and a good teacher. On both counts, isn’t this
what maxent is all about?
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